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Call centres have mushroomed as a new dominant paradigm for service 
delivery. This paper presents data from fieldwork into tele-nursing within 
the UK health service, NHS Direct, as ‘nursing down the phone’ can be seen 
as a new expression of this wider development. We argue that nursing as a 
category of work has not been transformed through the advent of tele-
nursing, unlike the situation in commercial call centres. Rather tele-nursing 
has appeared and developed as one further specialism within the nursing 
medical repertoire.  Furthermore, the organisation of NHS Direct, as a 
nurse-led and dominated service, may have permitted nurses to expand their 
knowledge and professional power. But we are not suggesting either an up-
skilling or knowledge worker thesis as two developments put pressure on 
nurse’s work. The first is the call centre pressures operating within NHS 
Direct, despite its’ non-commercial and information/referral character as a 
health advisory service and the presence of a discourse of transformation 
with management. The second is the operation of a Clinical Assessment 
System (CAS) that nurses are obliged to use when responding to 
caller/patient enquiries. Our conclusions point towards the interplay 
between occupational autonomy and organisational control within a new 




Call centre research has rightly focussed on the majority of call centre work in which new routine 
white-collar jobs are performed within commercial settings (Bain and Taylor, 1999, 2000; Taylor 
and Bain, 1999, 2001; Holtgrewe, et al 2002; Deery and Kline, 2004). The terms of debate within 
this literature are the familiar ones of control, autonomy, resistance and work intensification as 
signified by this ‘industrialisation’ of white-collar work as the unit size of workplaces increase and 
technology and modern bureaucracy intensify (Callaghan and Thompson, 2001; 2002). A central 
feature of call centres is their novelty and discontinuity as organisational spaces with a facility to 
spatially disaggregate customers and service delivery. As a transformative organisational typology, 
it signals disruption to occupational formation with task and career discontinuity between pre-
existing forms of white-collar work (in banking, telecommunications retailing, etc) and the activity 
of call centre workers (Deery and Kinnie, 2004). The work setting, the nature of the work and the 
workers are different in the High Street bank and the tele-bank. Work has been stretched spatially 
and temporally, as work moves to 24-7 access and labour reserves are sourced by price on an 
increasingly global scale as relationships between customers and service employees are made 
virtual. Critical to this relationship is the computer-mediated interaction between caller and worker. 
Through this process, workers are tied to computer generated scripts  and work-knowledge could be 
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said to be within the machine and not within workers as an occupational group. In classical labour 
process terms, the conception of work (design, planning, scheduling, intellectual content) has been 
concentrated within technology controlled by management and their allies, while workers become 
‘operators’ of tasks where their knowledge is fragmented, specialised and curtailed, and any formal 
sense of an occupational community engaging with holistic work processes eliminated (Braverman, 
1974).  
 
Moreover, job ladders, career structures, training and development, as well as the nature of the 
labour process within call centres has become fractured and transformed from traditional direct 
service provision, such as through banks. While new skills especially emotional labour, 
communication and inter-personal social skills have been intensified (Callaghan and Thompson, 
2001) - not simply developed as they were present in the former jobs - technical or craft based 
knowledge of an occupational or industrial field (such as banking) has been polarised between a 
mass of very narrow tasks acquired on-the-job without formal and continuing training, and a 
minority of more specialised jobs. Batt and Moynihan (2002) have called this the ‘mass’ model of 
the call centre, drawing a parallel with mass production in manufacturing. The spread of the call 
centre organisational category and the huge academic literature on its consequences, is witness to 
the transformational effects the new form of labour process organisation has had on white collar 
workers (see Mandelbaum, 2004 for the most comprehensive cataloguing of the field) 
 
However, not all workers in call centres are in this ‘mass’ situation or are working within a 
transformed labour process. For some workers, providing advice through the phone is similar in 
kind to providing the service face-to-face. In this paper we look at one such group, nurses, who 
have recently moved into call or contact centres to offer health advice and referral as part of the UK 
government’s commitment to modernise the delivery of social services. Empirically, we can see a 
number of differences between call centres for nurses and those for the commercial sector, although 
we are not suggesting that there is a functional (public-private) split between call centres as 
suggested by some writers (Glucksman, 2004), as this misses rationalisation forces within the 
public sector which are intensifying work (Bain et al, 2005; Fisher, 2004).  
 
Expert labour and call centres 
 
That there is a more complex interplay between expert labour and call centre rationalisation forces 
is evident in the case of nurses for several reasons. Firstly individual nurses move between face-to-
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face and tele-nursing, and tele-nurses are not a qualitatively different occupational category in the 
way that Customer Service Representatives (CSRs) are a different category of labour from bank 
tellers and other white-collar occupations transformed by the expansion of call centre work. It is an 
obvious fact that ‘tele-nursing’ is not a replacement for face to face health advice; it is rather an 
adjunct service. It is more typically provided for specialist services or on a local basis, and NHS 
Direct remains comparatively unique because it is a national service (O’Cathain et al 2004: 281). 
However NHS Direct nurses moved between conventional nursing settings and tele-nursing, and as 
such they were not dedicated specialised workers in the same way as CSRs in a commercial setting. 
In this way they retain contact with different nursing spaces, and retain their broader occupational 
expertise. The total number of nurses in call centres in England is a faction of the total nurse 
population. Moreover, ‘tele-nurses’ are not a separate grouping of nurses only doing tele-health 
work. Rather, from our research and that of others (Hanlon et al, 2005), tele-nurses increasingly 
work part-time, with work split between call centres and face-to-face settings with patients (such as 
hospitals and health centres). Where they work full time, it might be for a short period, in which 
they use NHS Direct as a stepping stone into management or into different nursing specialisms 
(Gabe et al 2005).  
 
Secondly, the size of nurse call centres is small by call centre industry standards. While there has 
been no comparative multi country research of differences in nurse experience of call centre 
settings, only two country research (Collin-Jacques, 2004; Collin-Jacques and Smith, 2005), what 
individual country cases reveal is that the units size of call centres varies, with a range between 16-
80 in the 22 English sites, and a mean average of 46 nurse advisors. While in Scotland NHS24, has 
larger 3 sites, with 280 the biggest. Size in commercial sector also varies, as Poster’s (2005) 
sophisticated analysis of 3 Indian call centres shows, but average unit size is bigger than for tele-
health – although this may be transitional in the case of NHS Direct, as Scotland’s NHS24 is looked 
to as the future by NHS Direct national planners (interview national manager NHS Direct ). The 
Scottish case has the largest numbers, reflecting the later development of the service, the perceived 
efficiencies of size, and the longer experience of call centre working in Scotland (Smith and Wise, 
2006) 
 
Thirdly, nurse call centres, such as NHS Direct, are ‘nurse-led’ services, and the conventional 
medical division of labour between nurses and doctors is different, as nurses are the dominant group 
in the call centre, and interact hierarchically with nurse managers, and not doctors, and therefore 
operate in a new authority space. While calls between nurses and caller-patients are routinely 
monitored by doctors (clinical directors) to ensure that nurses are not dispensing clinical advice, but 
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are rather following the protocols of the Clinical Assessment System (CAS). In practice monitoring 
of calls by clinical directors has not been found to be a major issue within NHS Direct. This is 
partly a work load issue, given that there is only one doctor per site. But more importantly 
monitoring, was found to be mainly used as a training not surveillance tool, and the use of CAS has 
been found to be a much bigger area of concern for the medical division of labour. Nurses are the 
dominant agent, with a short occupational hierarchy in the UK tele-nurse centres, consisting of 
Nurse Managers, Nurse Advisors, Health and Information Advisors and Call Handlers. Although a 
clinician is present in England and Scotland, for day-to-day control and organisation of the labour 
process, they have little role.  
 
However, there are also features of tele-nursing that makes it similar to other forms of call centre 
work. Firstly, nurses, like CSRs, follow a script, a Clinical Decision Support Software (CDSS) that 
guides nurse’s questioning of callers and assesses the urgency of need and most appropriate course 
of action. Actions or outcomes are prescribed and limited, and nurses can suggest home care; 
emergency ambulance call out; GP now; GP routine or nurse advice. While nurses can deviate from 
this script and decision outcomes suggested (as we explore in this paper) there is the sense that they 
are encountering patients as ‘caller/customers’ through multiple, one-off interactions which focus 
on one problem (symptom), rather than though longer term relations with fewer patients taken 
through a medical process of illness, recovery and departure. In other words, tele-nursing work, like 
call centre work, is fragmented in a way that nursing in a ward is not (Smith and Wise, 2006).  
 
Secondly, calls are be continuously streamed to Nurse Advisors who experience a sense of being 
‘paced by the machine’ akin to a worker on an assembly line. Work scheduling of calls is not 
controlled by nurses and nurses have no choice of the calls they get – the queue acting as a 
production pressure and work intensifier (Collin-Jacques, 2003; 2004).  
 
Thirdly although nurses are all Registered, they are not specialised to particular calls. So for 
example, although 40 per cent of all calls are paediatric in nature, about children, all nurses, not 
specialist ones, such as Registered Sick Children’s Nurses, give advice on these calls. In this sense 
tele-nurses come from different backgrounds, and are generalists, with the Clinical Decision 
Support Software (CDSS) – known as CAS – supporting them in reaching decisions. Unlike the 
case elsewhere in the health service, specialised training does not correspond with specialised work 
practice, and in this sense, expertise is not being reinforced within a particular occupational niche 
along professional lines, and hence the link between knowledge, power and practice associated with 
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specialisation is broken. Non-specialisation of calls is possible because CAS compensates for 
nurses lack of knowledge outside of their specialists area and general experience, and structures the 
interaction between caller and nurse in ways which are not objectively dissimilar to other call centre 
work (O’Cathain et al 2004). However, being registered experts does make things different as this 
paper will show. 
 
Fourthly, and related to the above, the non-correspondence between specialist knowledge and calls, 
and hence centrality of the CDSS to the nurse-caller exchange, invites the prospect of further 
rationalisation of knowledge through computerisation and automation controlled by non-nurses 
(management and IT specialists), and the possibilities of re-dividing nursing work and occupational 
knowledge through substitution and fragmentation. Had nurses controlled calls through 
specialisation, the prospects of such rationalisation would be more limited, but being generalists 
increases dependency on CAS and hence invites further breaks in the link between knowledge and 
action through technological not occupational control. 
 
Fifthly, nurses, like CSRs work on their own in a fixed position at a desk; interacting with callers 
through a form of Automatic Call Distribution Switches (ACDs). In most roles, nurses have 
freedom of movement, and when based in one location, such as a doctors’ surgery or a ward, they 
are not physically locked in one controlled position, but will move around in the course of their 
working day. In NHS Direct, they are fixed behind a desk for the first time. Potentially, this allows 
management to regulate the realisation of their labour power in a more predictable way, as the 
worker is physically and technically monitored more closely – technical control being a central 
element of the call centre regardless of the level of skill of the call centre worker (Callaghan and 
Thompson, 2001). The point being that nursing labour is accessible as a fixed resource available for 
managerial imagination for new uses for down time, to fill out the minutes of the working day. This 
could be with ‘follow-up calls’, reminding patients of check-up appointments in hospitals, 
providing health information or other, more imaginative, uses.  
 
We can see therefore, both differences and similarities between health and other call centre 
environments. However, what we suggest in this paper is that because nurses bring their expert 
knowledge into the call centre and interact with the CDSS using this knowledge as a reference and 
filter, their position is different from those CSRs who come into the call centre without any prior 
occupational knowledge pertinent to the work they perform. It is currently nurses, and no other 
group, that work as advisors. Medical knowledge does not solely rest with the computer/expert 
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system though, as the nurse is required to be registered with 3 (initially it was 5) years clinical 
experience as a prerequisite to being a tele-nurse and must have the expertise to interpret the 
dispositions from CAS. As we discuss below some nurses said that they could get the ‘disposition’ 
(outcome) they wanted by the way they used the CDSS, implying it is more of a tool they managed 
than a control device that was directing them. Nevertheless the CDSS was followed for most calls 
guides and suggests the dispositions given by nurses, and as such acts a kind of symbolic hierarchy 
and safety system to check nurses’ claims for clinical judgement. However, the way in which these 
operate in practice, and their effect on nurses’ knowledge acquisition and limitation, are unknown 
and require investigation, which is the subject of this paper. Although UK nurses did not design 
CAS they did not use it innocently or naively, but as experts, and as such there is an informed 
interaction between nurse’s know-how and automated knowledge that this paper will examine 
(Collin-Jacques and Smith, 2005).  
 
In this paper we will therefore examine the role of the Clinical Assessment System (CAS) as a 
constraint and enabler of knowledge or know how of nurses in this new setting. We will then 
explore the space for co-operative forms of knowledge sharing and exchange within the call centre, 
against pressures for individualisation through nurses concentrating on their own ‘call load’ and 
operating in isolation from fellow workers. We will then make some conclusions about the scope 
offered by NHSD for nurses to advance their professional power and knowledge. 
 
Background of the study 
 
The development of NHS Direct reflects several forces: generic trends in call centre usage and 
application; a move towards customer-centred service provision in a 24-hour society; modernisation 
and rationalisation within the public sector pursued most rigorously by the current Labour 
government; local initiatives within health care services, such as nurse triage. Not all of these forces 
are moving in the same direction, and in many ways NHS Direct exhibits conflicting dynamics, 
with quantitative pressures on call times, information capture and storage of all types of illness, 
existing alongside empathetic patient-centred nursing provided on an individualised basis. 
Moreover generic practice in the commercial call centre sector is ‘leaking’ into public spaces, and 
meeting professional, expert labour, for whom health advice is distinctive and incommensurate with 
general call centre norms. NHS Direct as 24-hour tele-health help-line was a key part of the current 
Labour governments 1997 proposals to modernise the NHS in England (Department of Health 
1997). The ambition to make NHS Direct the main ‘gateway’ into the NHS in England, responsible 
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for out-of hours booking, and eventually sending patient records electronically through the system, 
makes the service comparatively unique. As one of the members of the National Team interviewed 
in December 2004 indicated: ‘there are different systems around… but really at this sort of scale, 
dealing with these volume of calls, and the portfolio business that we’ve got now, this is probably 
unique.’ As the service is, according to a manager from the bigger of our two case studies, a 
manifestation of a more private and isolated form of society; a demand for professional or expert 
knowledge and advice and an attempt by the state to educate the public in the ‘efficient’ 
consumption of public services in order to make people, in true utilitarian manner, feel ‘happier’: 
 
I think what’s tended to happen with society as a whole is that people have become more 
isolated, they don’t have the sort of support networks, such as extended families, that used to be 
in place for people.  Now whether or not some of those support networks gave people the right 
advice, at least they were there, at least they gave them some advice, those infrastructures just 
aren’t there now, and so I think we are moving to a situation where people feel more 
comfortable in being able to get some kind of professional support and to get the right answers, 
and I think that is the other side of things, which is that people now have an expectation, that 
they ought to be able to get the right answers, not just some answers, not just somebody saying 
something to them and then believing it just because somebody’s said it, I think there’s a sort of 
belief coming in that you need to be able to get the right answers, and that somebody ought to 
be providing that Service, so here we are doing that, and yes I mean it is very ‘Nannyish’, but at 
the same time I think if we can point more people in the right direction, if we can stop people 
wandering down for a five hour wait into an A & E Department, get them treatment in fifteen 
minutes at a Primary Care Centre, I mean that’s got to be good news for everybody, because it 
makes everybody happier. Manager NHS Direct A 
 
There are currently 22 NHS Direct call centres covering the whole of England, with each site 
having a catchment area of between 1.3 and 4 million people (NHS Direct: A New Gateway to 
Health Care, 2001: 5). The call centres are hosted in a variety of health care organizations, such as 
ambulance services, Primary Care Trusts, NHS Trusts A&E departments and GP-Co-ops. During 
the year 2000-2001, NHS Direct received approximately 3.5 million calls (National Audit Office, 
2002:19). NHS Direct calls have been growing steadily and, according to the new strategic 
document of the Department of Health, Developing NHS Direct (2003), new investments will 
facilitate almost a threefold expansion in NHS Direct capacity over the next 3-4 years. Current 
levels of capacity are 6 millions calls per year. By the end of 2006, it is expected that NHS Direct 
will be able to handle 16 millions calls per year (DoH, 2003).  
Methodology 
We researched two NHS Direct sites serving different kinds of localities with respect to population 
and patterns of service provision: provincial/urban area (NHSD A) and metropolitan area (NHSD 
B). We also took into account the size of each call centre by considering the number of staff in post, 
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for both NAs and CHs. We selected a medium sized call centre, NHSD A -which counts 52 full 
time Nurse Advisors (NAs) and 24 full time Call-Handlers (CHs) and a small sized call centre, call 
NHSD B -composed of 24 full-time NAs and 14 full-time CHs. In total, we conducted 64 
interviews with nurse advisors, managers, clinical directors, call handlers, health information 
advisors, librarians, GPs and pharmacists. The interviews took place between April 2003 and 
February 2004. Interviews lasted between forty-five minutes and one and a half hours and were 
tape-recorded and fully transcribed. The interviews with the NAs and managers focused on how 
nursing ‘on line’ differed from conventional nursing practice; how the work is organised and the 
level of autonomy that NAs can exercise over their work; the level of interaction between NAs, 
CHs and health information advisors, and to what extent inter- and intra-occupational knowledge is 
reinforced or transcended. 
Non-participant observation was undertaken at both the case study sites for two 2 week periods 
approximately 6 months apart. The purpose behind doing two fieldwork investigations into the 
same sites was to capture changes due to the rapid evolution of this new service within the NHS. 
The observation involved sitting close by and listening to conversations between nurse advisors and 
callers, observing work dynamics within the call centre and sitting in on training sessions and 
nurses’ assessment days. Nurses’ interactions with other nurses, CHs and managers in the bureau 
(the term used to describe the work space) were also observed. 
The aim of these observations was to capture the interaction between the NAs and the CDSS, how 
they used their professional skills and shared their specialist knowledge and how they coped with 
stressful situations. As NHS Direct provides a 24 hours service, observations were conducted 
during different periods (conventional working days and week-ends) and different times (mornings, 
afternoons and nights). Detailed field notes were taken during and after the observations took place. 
Observations have been initially recorded by means of ‘jotted notes’ developed into ‘full field 
notes’ as soon as possible after the researcher has left the site.  
Younger, single, better qualified nurses found mainly in Site B were more likely to work part-time, 
and these nurse dominated Site B, the Metropolitan site; whereas more full-time and older, less 
formally qualified, married with children nurses were more present in provincial Site A. There 
appeared to be an interaction between the profile of nurses and labour market opportunities in the 
two sites, indicating that a ‘one size fits all’ strategy for recruitment would have difficulties in this 
service.    
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The Clinical Assessment System (CAS) and Labour Control  
 
CAS, the main working device utilized by NAs, is based on a series of algorithms which nurses 
must follow for ensuring safe telephone advice. CAS forces nurses to ask the caller one automated 
question at a time by following a logical order. The questions that nurses must ask take one of two 
forms: either a leading question with a “Yes”, “No” or “Uncertain”, or a list of symptoms that the 
callers should answer. Nurses cannot bypass the list of the questions, even when the NA realises 
that the algorithm is leading to an inappropriate medical track. The CDSS also includes a ‘Free 
Text’ box where nurses can add further notes relating to the questions asked; however NAs have 
little freedom in the assessment process itself. 
 
Evidence revealed that at first sight CAS protocols restricts and prescribes NAs’ autonomy 
rendering their work repetitive and routinised. Previous research on NHS Direct (Collin-Jacques, 
2004) suggested that CAS reflects the third principle of Taylorism (Braverman, 1974) according to 
which management directly control the labour process and its mode of execution. Within Taylorism 
these directives were conveyed in a top-down manner on written instruction cards. According to 
this analysis, within NHS Direct the rigid and scientific algorithms embedded in CAS determine in 
a precise manner in which NAs should execute their tasks. Thus, CAS, through the algorithm based 
logic, fragmented the assessment process by prompting one question at a time, meticulously co-
ordinated by the algorithms. Thus CAS restrains nurses’ clinical knowledge by preventing them 
from seeing ‘the whole picture’ of the assessment and narrows down their clinical reasoning. 
 
For management, control was facilitated by steering communications through CAS. This allowed 
electronic and remote capturing of data as rich information about the length of calls, types of calls, 
frequency of calls during the day, week and year; and variability between NAs in terms of call 
times. This information created or served to produce ‘objectivity’ to management control – the 
centralisation of work-flow information – and the possibility (perhaps illusion) for an underlying 
rationality of management planning and operational control. This in turn generated new 
management posts of ‘operations managers’ or ‘planning managers’, (sometimes from the Call 
Centre industry, sometimes from within the Health Service) and rich, factual information for local 
and central management teams to remotely plan the labour process of Nurse Advisors and Call 
Handlers. CAS, as a central part of the call centre character of NHS Direct fed into ‘discourse of 
transformation’ that had occurred in other industries, changing labour processes through dilution of 
skills and labour substitution. However, as we shall see, NAs and other discourses (around safety, 
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health values and the specific character of the NHS) were in competition with this agenda. In an 
interview with a member of the Central NHS Direct team, the unique position of a ‘data rich’ NHS 
Direct was stressed: 
 
NHSD is unlike any other part of the health service that I’ve ever worked in, in that we are 
incredibly data rich. I can tell you almost anything about this organisation, there is so much data 
out there and the problem is that unlike working in a ward, here I can tell you to the second how 
long it takes to do various functions and it’s grown into an industry and to some extent that’s a 
response to the need to get into capacity improvement and productivity, we need to understand 
what’s going on. So there has been a growth in the use of data. (Manager Central NHS Direct 
team) 
 
Therefore, in some ways the apparatus of the call centre environment comes into NHSD. However, 
this does not mean that performance and production values necessarily dominate management 
discourse to the exclusion of other voices. As we have argued elsewhere, safety and service are very 
strong values, and can be used by Nurse Advisors at those times when management or the pressures 
of the ‘queue’ may push the values of output and quantity (Mueller et al 2003). The same manager 
made this point: 
 
We do seem to talk a lot about productivity but what we are actually really about is delivering a 
patient service, these are patients, it’s not like the rest of the call centre industry trying to get as 
many calls out of it as possible because that’s where they make profit. This is actually about 
patients and that’s a message we are having to push really hard because I think it’s been 
forgotten. (Manager Central NHS Direct team) 
 
 
From the Nurse Advisor’s perspective the contrast between the call centre and the ward was seen in 
business and productivity terms: 
 
I would say it’s very different when they start talking to you about call times, numbers of calls 
and things, because you know coming from working on a Ward to NHS Direct is very different.  
NHS Direct seems to be run a bit like a business.  They’ve started sticking up graphs now with 
our call times and the amount of calls. And it’s just like you can’t, you can’t, I know there are 
some calls you can get through really quickly that are straightforward, but you can’t, you can’t, 
with Mental Health calls, or elderly people, you know you can’t put a, you know “I must get 
this person off the phone in seven minutes, or nine minutes, or whatever”. (Nurse Advisor 
NHSD A) 
 
While the Lead Nurse below stresses the differences in the values between the ‘commercial’ call 
centre environment and NHSD: 
 
There are certain problems that we’d have with adopting [the practice of] Commercial Call 
Centres. You know there would be a great deal of difference between what a person that takes 
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calls in a Commercial Call Centre earns and what our Nurse earns, but there are some 
similarities. … With Nurses, because they’re such a valuable resource to the NHS, we’re trying 
to keep them in a career, so those kinds of approaches that might be usable in a Commercial 
Call Centre, there would be constraints on us adopting some of those Strategies, but I think it’s a 
happy medium, I think we can learn from the way that the good Commercial Call Centres do 
manage to achieve their objectives. (Lead Nurse Advisor NHSD A) 
 
Occupational knowledge and CAS  
 
A central part of the dialogue between those stressing the uniqueness of NHS Direct and those 
stressing its embedding within the call centre industry was the way nurse’s clinical skills and 
knowledge interacted with CAS, through which calls (and nurses) were directed. Initially Nurse 
Advisors needed a minimum of five years’ post-qualification experience before starting to work for 
NHS Direct (National Audit Office, 2002: 15). This was later reduced to three years. During these 
years NAs acquire clinical knowledge and experience, which is not diminished during their phone 
consultations, however they revealed that on some occasions they find it difficult to utilise their 
previous expertise. Although NHSD management allows NAs to use their clinical knowledge 
during the phone consultations, the system itself limits the use of previous clinical skills. As these 
NAs pointed out: 
 
I think it’s good that we have the CAS as a framework, but if we are supposed to be using our 
Clinical skills, then we shouldn’t have to follow them so rigidly.  You know you’ve already 
asked the patient once whether they have any breathing problems, they say “no”, there’s no 
need to keep going through you know “so you’re breathing normally, you don’t have blah, 
blah?”.  So as a framework fine, we do need a framework to be safe I think, and to give us that 
bit to go on, but there should be a bit more scope I think to use our Clinical judgment and skills. 
(Nurse Advisor 6, NHSD B) 
 
It [CAS] has its moments.  … it can be limiting sometimes, so sometimes you actually have to 
look at the broader picture and basically, not circumvent, but go through the Algorithm ….  So 
it’s not interactive from that point of view, but it’s all right, it’s improved since I’ve started, it’s 
now at I think version nine or ten.  (Nurse Advisor, NHSD B) 
 
 
Similar to previous research (Collin-Jacques, 2004), NAs in our research claimed that CAS 
restricted their ability to use acquired clinical knowledge during their phone consultations. 
However, as NAs affirmed, other issues limit their ability to exercise clinical judgement. During 
semi-structured interviews NAs have been asked to summarise the most important skill required to 
work as tele-nurse. An NA replied that: 
 
Having a very good broad based knowledge to start with, and obviously being able to use the 
computer and the Algorithms. They can be a bit awkward sometimes, they’re not always 100% 
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the Algorithms, and obviously because we try to defend, we’re a bit defensive. I think we’re a 
bit defensive about the nursing, in the sense that we are afraid of litigation, and of anything 
going wrong. So even though we have a skill that can identify problems, most of the time we 
kind of feel we have to stick to the Algorithms, and it’s hard for us to go outside the Algorithms 
and use our knowledge and our skills and things like to make decisions, because of the fear that 
if we go outside the Algorithm and something happens, we wouldn’t be covered you see, so I 
find that a bit difficult sometimes, because I can tell clearly sometimes that there’s no need to go 
in that direction, but that’s the direction the Algorithm is taking me and so I go.(Nurse Advisor 
7 NHSD B) 
 
And another said: 
 
I suppose that you’re restricted in a certain way, because you’re taught during Training that you 
have to respond in a particular way.  You’re supposed to work methodically through the 
Assessment and through the Algorithms, not skipping over anything, you’re supposed to read 
the rationale.  That can be quite difficult, because I mean obviously people work at a different 
pace, they read at a different pace, and sometimes the rationale is a huge page that comes up 
with, you know every time the computer screen changes, and you don’t necessarily have time, 
well you don’t have time to read through it all, you can only sort of skim very briefly over 
certain parts of it, but you’re very, very conscious that you have to be reacting according to how 
you’ve been taught and what’s expected of you.  I think sometimes I worry a little bit about 
upgrading or downgrading the final disposition, because sometimes you literally get a final 
disposition of ‘Home Care’ come up and you’ve known, from the onset of the call that you’re 
going to be sending them to Hospital.  Or you might get, vice versa, the screen might come up 
with ‘Immediate Ambulance 999’, and you’re thinking “no, ‘Home Care’s’ okay on this”.  So 
it’s a little worrying, particularly if you’re downgrading from ‘999’ to ‘Home Care’, you’re 
wondering if you’re going to be pulled ‘over the coals’, for that particular reason. (Nurse 
Advisor, NHSD A) 
 
 
These examples demonstrate that the CDSS does not annihilate critical thinking, as both managers 
and NAs are conscious that the software is over-cautious. However, under certain circumstances, 
especially where they are outside of their prior specialist area (O’Cathain et al 2004), NAs decide to 
rely on the CAS decisions instead of their own judgement in order to protect themselves from 
litigation.  
 
The national view was that NAs should be using the CDSS but critically, as this manager from the 
national team explains: 
 
We saw that there was a tight correlation between the relatively few adverse incidents we’ve 
had and people not using the system at all. And so we’ve majored on that, people now are using 
the system to a far greater extent. But we accept that these are nurses and are allowed and 
expected to use their critical skills, so we do see this range of raising the outcome or lowering 
the outcome and we’d expect to see somewhere around 15% - 20% changes. If it’s lower than 
that, then people aren’t thinking, they are just sticking to the system, so there has to be some 
variation. (Manager Central NHS Direct team) 
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The CDSS possessed a certain objective or formal rationality and certainty, whereas the clinical 
occupational judgement of the individual nurse by definition was subjective and context-specific. 
The need for the NA to formally justify all up-grading and down-grading (what the above informant 
refers to as raising and lowering the outcome) places an onus on the Nurse Advisor ‘making a case’, 
placing her judgement against the CDSS. This requires confidence, experience and an institutional 
climate of support, which is engendered by management policy and style, and we noted variations 
between our two sites in the frequency of challenges to the CDSS, as did Collin-Jacques (2003) in 
her fieldwork. However, technical control through driving down call times was not seen as part of 
the NHS Direct mission, but because the nurse were monitored though the system, but also working 
autonomously away from the system (checking cases, consulting data bases, discussing cases within 
the team etc) this meant more direct forms of supervisory control were required. For the national 
team this meant rationalisation of the 22 centres into larger units along the model of NHS24 in 
Scotland as well as improving management controls. The same manager again: 
 
We have this whole new range of instruments to look at what’s going on. And what we tried to 
do is try to bring together the operational and the clinical sides at an optimum level for both and 
not doing one at the cost of the other, so we don’t drive down call length and find that 
everybody sends everybody off to 999 because that’s very easy, you can do that quickly, the call 
length is five minutes, but that’s an easy solution, that’s not what we are looking for, it’s about 
the balance and getting right the whole range of things. And then into the whole area of 
productivity as well, if you take the sort of priorities we are looking at there, we are also now 
starting to look at what people are actually doing when they are working in the call centre i.e. 
when are they available to take calls, when they are doing other things, recognising that they do 
other things both nurses and call handlers when they are working, quite legitimately, looking 
things up, discussing cases etc. and there is also a section where we are not so sure about, but 
it’s still significant, where we don’t know what they are doing, so it’s about managing that 
whole process as well, and that comes back to the bigger call centres and being able to manage 
that promptly rather than expecting people to just do it.(emphasis added) (Manager Central 
NHS Direct team) 
 
At the national level there was also an on-going conversation about the division of work, and 
whether experienced and qualified nurses were needed or whether the call could be divided up and 
given to different agents, not all of whom where qualified nurses. In other words, despite a formal 
commitment amongst NAs, lead nurses and managers at various levels of the service to stress the 
importance of nurses and the autonomy of their relationship with callers, the ‘discourse of 
transformation’ was evident. A system of prioritisation of calls had meant that Call Handler no-
longer routed all calls to nurses, but answered some directly, sent other to Health Information 
Advisors, and then ranked the seriousness of the call using a simple formula, before this was 
allocated to NAs. This was possible in NHS Direct because CHs took the initial calls and not 
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Nurses as was the case in Canada (Collin-Jacques and Smith, 2005) and Australia (Larsen, 2005). 
One Manager from NHSD A said this could be taken further with call screening: 
 
Instead of our Call Handlers just asking a few questions, they’ll actually be having to ask 
several minutes worth of questions, but then, instead of jumping say just to the Nurse, you could 
actually go a whole range of other resources, and in fact, if it was urgent, instead of even going 
to the Nurse, they could send people directly to Accident and Emergency, without even going to 
the Nurse.... Or it could be looked at in a much wider context, such as calls going directly to 
GP’s, or GP Out of Hours Centres, for example, and other calls coming into NHS Direct, and 
other calls coming into a Health Information Function. (Manager NHSD A) 
 
Prioritisation and Call Screening are call centre industry strategies for managing volumes. The same 
manager also approached the issue of replacing nurses with another category of labour more 
cautiously. However the question is indicative of call centre managerialism, looking at labour 
substitution and costs, whereas the national manager stressed the embedding of NHS Direct within 
the institutional norms and values of the NHS: 
 
In the future, at some point, we don’t know obviously how long it’s going to take, but I mean 
there are always discussions about “is it even possible, maybe, that we don’t have to have 
Nurses doing the Clinical bit of calls, could it be done with Paramedics?” 
 
And what’s your view on that? 
 
My view is that, conceptually, it is possible, because a lot of the Algorithms that we’re working 
to at the moment are very scripted, and they don’t need a lot of interpretation, but we need a lot 
more work on that to see how much interpretation is actually going into them by the Nurses, 
because Nurses can override them at the moment, and clearly if you’ve got somebody less 
qualified, you couldn’t do that.  It has to be very much more rigid in the way those are 
approached, but those thoughts are going on. (Manager NHSD A) 
 
The above manager had an IT not medical background, and call centre rhetoric and ideas are always 
present in NHS Direct management at all levels. But while in play this ‘discourse of transformation’ 
(converting nurses’ labour power along the lines of other workers in the sector) was in competition 
with operational practicalities of delivering ‘safe’ advice within a health sector context. Moreover, 
even IT managers were sceptical about the putting too much faith in the CDSS rather than nurses as 
the Trainer for NHS Direct B, comparing CAS with the earlier CDSS system TAS notes below. In 
both systems there was need for nurse’s clinical knowledge, as they were programmed with medical 
data for the ‘average’ symptom, when caller/patients may present symptoms that are not average. In 
other words, interpretive knowledge provided by the nurse as ‘expert’ was required: 
 
Maybe one system or another system, doesn’t allow the person to contextualise the call.  
Certainly, I mean all of these systems are based on mean average presentations, and callers 
don’t present in a mean average way, so the Nurse has to contextualise the call, but to what 
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extent does any given system actually enhance that contextualisation? Given the way it is, 
there’s plenty more research required into that mean. (Trainer NHS Direct B site) 
 
 
Nurse Advisors interacted with CAS in different ways which related to an ‘attitude to risk’, 
experience and age, that is, personal factors, as well as the climate created by management. On this 
latter point there were differences in management in the two sites, for example at NHSD B, the 
manager was proud of the fact that ‘the site received the best record for sticking to protocols [which 
was] according to him, a mark for excellence’. But in addition to site variation there was internal 
variation by individual NAs. For all nurses their clinical knowledge, in fact, allowed them to change 
the CDSS disposition and under-ride and over-ride the algorithms of the and still provide a safe 
advice: 
 
After all’s said and done, when I sit at that desk with the software, that is an Assessment aid, 
and I only use my Clinical knowledge, and I can override that Assessment aid at any point.  If I 
feel that the Clinical situation that I’m discussing with a patient warrants it, I can override that.  
As long as I can justify my decision, I can override it. (Nurse Advisor 9, NHSD A) 
 
The practice of manipulating the software through the process of under-riding and over-riding was 
elicited by management, but both managers and NAs were aware of the limits of CAS. Thus, it 
became important to appropriately utilise previously acquired clinical knowledge to deviate from 
advice that appears on the screen. CAS in fact provided NAs with abstract and prescribed clinical 
advice but it did not consider the context in which the conversation took place:  
 
Yes I think you have to [to over-ride/under-ride], because although it’s there to guide you and 
help you, let’s just say, for instance, the computer doesn’t know that the person, let’s say who’s 
ringing up with sickness and diarrhoea, that that person is an Insulin dependent Diabetic, you 
know there isn’t anything on the screen to say that, so you have to be aware that all the time that 
you’re asking those questions, you have to remember that this man takes Insulin, is a Diabetic, 
whereas a normal diarrhoea and vomiting you can give them the care, what to do, you have to 
be aware, but that doesn’t come up on the screen, so your clinical knowledge might have to 
come in to play on that front. (Nurse Advisor 13, NHSD A) 
 
NAs, as experts, were able to see the context or bigger picture, whereas the CDSS was fragmenting 
and, as noted earlier, abstracting by de-contextualising in treating symptoms as average. Any 
deviations from the software necessitated recording and appeared clearly in the monthly 
productivity reports, which are distributed to each NA. These statistical data also made known to 
management which were the most commonly over-ridden and under-ridden algorithms. If a 
particular algorithm is under-ridden by several NAs, it means that there might be something wrong, 
thus the central CAS team can go back to the CDSS and review the system. Nurses, by using their 
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previous clinical knowledge for manipulating the software can actually change the main source of 
prescribed knowledge, i.e. CAS.  
 
Tacit and codified knowledge? 
 
The myth of CAS is that codified knowledge in some way provides self-evident information about 
all clinical conditions, when in practice the interpretation of the codified information depends very 
much on the knowledge of the agent (Johnson and Lundvall, 2001). Who’s using the system will 
produce different outcomes. During initial recruitment managers said to us that nurses with A & E 
backgrounds processed callers quickly, while those with health information backgrounds spend the 
longest on the phone. Different clinical backgrounds pre-disposed callers to different interactions, 
although through training, the evolution of the service and accumulation of experience on millions 
of calls and cases, created more standardisation. However NAs remained generalists, and labour 
market pressures would probably maintain this situation. 
 
That the system required nurses with 3 years experience to operate CAS underwrites the storing of 
knowledge within an occupational community, which when interacting with CAS, could arrive at 
safe dispositions. The knowledgeable community, and not only the CDSS codes on clinical 
conditions, interact in ways that are different from a community lacking in clinical training, which 
would be system-dependent (reliant on codified information alone) and hence unable to interpret, 
contextualise or revise CAS which is what nurses do. 
 
The common practice of under-riding and over-riding CAS entailed a process of setting the 
common sense, experience and knowledge of the nurse against the CDSS, and was a creative 
process. NAs’ tacit and empirical knowledge is transformed, through their manipulation of the 
software, into a more explicit and encoded knowledge, via the management. In terms of 
conceptualisation of knowledge, Polanyi’s (1958, 1967) most basic distinction between tacit 
knowledge and explicit knowledge has some initial appeal. Tacit knowledge is personal, context-
specific and hard to formalise and communicate without discussion. Tacit knowledge is based upon 
the ‘indwelling’ of awareness and understanding by individuals- ‘we know more than we can tell’ 
(Polanyi 1967:4). Explicit or ‘codified’ knowledge, on the other hand, refers to knowledge that is 
transmittable through formal procedures such as writing or IT. However, when applying tacit and 
explicit knowledge to NHS Direct, the limitations of the terms become clear. CAS stores codified 
knowledge, but cannot be operated safely without experienced labour, who bring with them clinical 
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knowledge, but also have to contextualise each interaction with CAS as callers are not standardised. 
Clinical information is stored within CAS which is accessed by trained nurses, who also represent a 
knowledge community, and social agents who encounter CAS in a critical or interpretive way, as 
even formalised knowledge needs interpretation. Within work situations, such as NHS Direct, 
codification of knowledge is not simply within CAS, but the occupational community operating the 
CDSS - the trained nurses. The site of interaction of these two knowledge sources is through the 
workplace where interaction is further conditioned by the particular team of nurses on any particular 
shift (who may share information in different ways depending on team coherence); the time 
pressures of the work process (and how many calls are waiting); and the individual nurse advisor 
and her or his readiness to share information and or challenge the dispositions of the CDSS. In other 
words, dividing knowledge into dual categories of codified and tacit is not especially useful in a 
context where the condition for information sharing and challenging vary (Johnson and Lundvall, 
2001).  
 
Labour process theory would also suggest that due to the indeterminacy of labour – the absence of 
stable agreed standards of work effort between employers and workers – knowledge, skills, 
information and sharing exist within a terrain of conflict or contestation between workers and 
managers, and what is tacit and what is codified will depend upon outcomes of these struggles 
(Thompson, 1989; Smith and Thompson, 1998; Smith, 2006). As we have already noted, 
management actors held differing perceptions about the relationship between knowledge (in its 
broadest sense) held by the occupational group and embodied with CAS as a management 
controlled tool. The discourse of transformation was about removing the centrality of the nurse 
from the call through the use of CAS and labour substitution. However such a discourse is not 
unproblematic, and does not go uncontested, even within management. Cost-benefit analysis is 
applied to knowledge within commercial call centres; but moving off-shore or replacing nurses with 
lower grade labour are problematic in NHS Direct. Within tele-health, there is more a struggle over 
boundaries between different groups, and given the centrality of NAs to the service as it has been 
constituted, they are in powerful positions to challenge non-clinical intervention by operational 
managers with a call centre pedigree, as well as lead nurses with an inflated faith in technology over 
people.  
 
The practice of manipulating the CDSS mainly relied upon previous NAs’ empirical experience 
acquired in clinical settings. Although they refer to clinical knowledge, that is formal knowledge, 
they were also directed by additional contextual and empirical knowledge. For instance, during field 
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observations many nurses pointed out that they over-ride the algorithms about ‘breathing problems’ 
since they could perfectly hear that the patient was not out of breath. In addition, many NAs 
acknowledged that they under-ride the algorithm about back pain, because ‘otherwise you would 
send everybody to 999, just because they have a bit of back pain’. As mentioned, all the practices of 
under-riding and over-riding needed justification. Through this process of justification NAs 
transform initial intuition or common sense into explicit knowledge: ‘I can’t send the caller to 999’ 
becomes formal knowledge, by justifying that the symptoms were not too worrying or by claiming 
that CAS does not provide appropriate protocols. In particular cases, management by analysing 
these manipulations create new abstract knowledge, by adding new algorithms to the CDSS. 
 
It appears that NHS Direct management gives nurses opportunities to exercise autonomy over their 
work. As mentioned, many nurses clearly pointed out that CAS is not as perfect as it appears, ‘there 
are still an awful lot of conditions that aren’t covered’ (NA 8, NHSD, A). The ability to combine 
previous practical clinical knowledge with CAS becomes a prerequisite in order to provide safe 
advice. Thus management requires nurses’ co-operation for improving CAS. Nurses’ co-operation 
is achieved by letting them freely utilise their own clinical knowledge and their pre-existing medical 
‘intuition’ during phone consultations.  
 
Over-riding and under-riding are not the only way for manipulating the CDSS by using previous 
clinical knowledge and skills. Field observations revealed that NAs manipulated the software by re-
reformulating CAS questions, adding new questions, and dismissing irrelevant questions. These 
processes demonstrated NAs’ ability to utilise and re-shape clinical knowledge for re-directing 
CAS. Observations in NHSD call centres showed that NAs employed words from our everyday 
language during their phone consultations in order to refer to clinical symptoms. For instance, NAs 
try to visualise a child’s mucus by asking the mother: ‘Is it frothy, like frothy coffee?’ Such 
wording is not present in CAS and reflects NAs’ ability of utilising their previous practical skills 
and experience for appropriately utilising the CDSS. Again, nurses’ practical knowledge cannot be 
separated from abstract knowledge incorporated into CAS. 
 
Field observations also revealed that the practice of reshaping CAS questions is mainly utilised 
during paediatric calls, which represent 40 per cent of calls made to the service. It was quite 
common to hear NAs utilising ‘childish’ words such as: ‘Is she rubbing her tummy?’ Through these 
processes NAs wanted to communicate that they are not ‘robots’ who provide advice simply by 
automatically repeating standardised questions (see also O’Cathain et al 2004: 283). Moreover, they 
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posit the issue of ‘educating’ or ‘empowering’ the callers. NAs said that only by using callers’ 
words could they can help educate them. Through the re-elaborations of CAS questions, NAs 
claimed to transmit basic clinical knowledge back to the callers. The abstract CDSS becomes thus a 
source of ordinary clinical knowledge for the public. 
 
In addition, for many nurses CAS even represents a source of new knowledge for themselves as 
well. Many NAs pointed out that by working for NHS Direct and using the software they increased 
their clinical knowledge: ‘a lot of things I didn’t know before, things I knew but like probably half 
of it and not the whole picture’ (Nurse Advisor 16, NHSD A). Or: ‘It (CAS) also makes you very 
aware that you had a big gap in your knowledge to do with the illnesses, because if you’ve been 
working in a surgical area, but somebody’s phoned in with something that was nothing to do with 
Surgery, with Hospital based stuff, then you realised there was a yawning gap there’ (Nurse 
Advisor, NHSD A). While in wards and other clinical settings, nurses acquired specific clinical 
competences, within NHS Direct nurses have to deal with a greater variety of clinical situations. 
According to some NAs, NHS Direct presents a valuable experience for gaining new clinical 
competences and progressing their career in other NHS clinical settings. 
 
It’s definitely a big increase in my knowledge and that’s a big plus to me.  It created 
opportunities in terms of primary care roles, which is something I would have never got into.  
It’s brought me back into general Nursing basically, because I started off in general, and went 
and did my Psychiatric, and I wouldn’t have been able to move back into general Nursing 
without coming to NHS Direct, so it’s opened up general Nursing back to me ...  (Nurse Advisor 
14, NHSD A) 
 
 
NAs agreed that CAS was a valued source of clinical information, however, many of them also 
claimed that it only provided general, formalised knowledge. According to some NAs it would be 
difficult to come back to a traditional clinical setting because of their lack of practical experience. 
Nursing was more than clinical assessments, and as noted earlier, NHS Direct does fragment the 
nursing process. However, one can also claim that in the first case, nurses lose their practical skills, 
but they also acquire new ‘telenursing’ skills, such as computing skills, listening skills and multi-
tasking. Instead of being ‘Ward nurses’ or ‘Casualty Sister’ they are ‘Tele-Nurses’ – however 
poorly constituted this specialism is. They do not lose their professional and clinical knowledge but 
they reshape it: 
 
Yes I think they (clinical nurses) probably feel that we’re deskilled, because we haven’t actually 
touched a patient.  But then again that’s their ignorance, because they don’t understand the 
knowledge that you build up, because of NHS Direct… you become an expert in telephone 
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consultation, which is a field, and not everybody can do it, which is proved by the amount of 
staff that we lose when they actually have to come on-line after their training.  (Nurse Advisor 
9, NHSD A) 
 
Generating new knowledge through informal co-operation and existing resources 
 
Observations in the field and conversations with nurse advisors suggested a significant level of co-
operation and exchange of knowledge among nurse advisors in the bureau. These practices of 
knowledge-sharing and co-operation can take different forms and entail several objectives. 
 
Informal information sharing 
 
For instance, NAs are allowed to stop the phone consultation for a few minutes in order to ask their 
colleagues a second opinion about a particular clinical situation.  In this way they critically use CAS 
and acquire new clinical knowledge: 
 
Yes it tends to be on what I consider to be an informal basis rather than with me sitting there 
and saying, “right today I’m going to talk to everybody about Mental Health”.  It’s more of an 
informal basis.  If you’ve got somebody that you’re talking to, a caller, I don’t know 
somebody’s who’s pregnant, and they’re asking a question that I don’t know, I’ll see if I can 
find a Midwife, or a Health Visitor, in the Bureau.  I mean that tends to be the way 
information’s shared around, on an informal - finding somebody who you know knows a bit 
more about it than you, and getting the information off them. (Nurse Advisor 14, NHSD A) 
 
Quite often – I mean, as I say, my specialism would be very much babies, mothers, children, 
that sort of area.  So a lot of times if other Nurses maybe had a young baby, or something like 
that, you know they’d put the caller on hold and come and maybe have a word with me.  
Similarly, I wouldn’t be terribly ‘au fait’ with maybe things like Orthopaedic or Fractures, or 
what to do with broken fingers.  So anything like that, I would go to one of the Casualty Sisters, 
who would have information. (Nurse Advisor 9, NHSD B) 
 
This process of sharing clinical knowledge takes place in an informal way within the bureau and 
was not prevented by the management. The level of freedom that NAs can exercise is atypical of a 
call centre environment.  Commercial call centres are conventionally target-driven, and 
consequently CSRs (Customer Service Representatives) must take one call after another. 
Commercial call centres rely on ACD (Automatic Call Distribution) system, where incoming calls 
are automatically channelled to waiting ‘customers service representatives’ or ‘agents’, removing 
the need for switchboard operators. Recent literature on commercial call centres (Bain and Taylor, 
1999) argues that information technology intensifies the labour process by forcing the agents to take 
call after call.  NAs within NHSD do not have to deal with this time pressure. Although central 
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management indicates the medium time that a call should take (6-8 minutes), the length of their 
calls is monitored and statistical data appear in monthly reports, they are allowed to take longer for 
a difficult telephone consultation and to interrupt the call for asking further advice from their 
colleagues and shift supervisors. NAs do not receive calls automatically so that they can organise 
their work with more freedom.  
 
With less time pressure, NHSD can thus become a place of learning. NAs can actually stop the 
phone consultations for a few minutes and get suggestions from more competent nurses regarding 
the algorithms that they should use or minor clinical questions. Informal co-operation is beneficial 
for both management and NAs. By allowing informal co-operation, experienced NAs can 
informally train new nurses, who are not familiar with the CDSS, this aspect was particularly 
important during the initial phase of NHSD experience. In addition informal co-operation allowed a 
further exchange of clinical knowledge, and NAs expressed their appreciation for being able to 
learn new knowledge and share previous practical experience with their colleagues. 
 
Yes [NSHD provides] a general knowledge and learning off our colleagues.  So I think that’s 
where it’s quite good, because we’re not separated into a Maternity Department, or a Paediatric 
Department, we’re all working together and basically everyone acknowledges everyone has 
different levels of experiences, knowledge and that we can use that to our advantage.  I think 
that’s what makes it work so well. (Nurse Advisor 7, NHSD B) 
 
You consult them if you are unsure of something, and you want some extra information on 
something, and you probably know their specialty, because everybody lets everybody know, 
that’s something that when I first started everybody can let everybody else know what specialty 
you came from, so like if there’s a Midwifery query, and you’re not too sure of things, you can 
go and speak to the Midwife. (Nurse Advisor 16, NHSD A) 
 
The practices of co-operation and sharing of knowledge make the labour process more varied and 
less routinised, but at the same time it reinforce nurses’ commitment and integration into CAS.  
 
NHS Direct as a Learning Community? 
 
Thus, if at first glance NHS Direct can be described as a place of learning and informal 
development, but as the service evolved these values came under pressure. Informal co-operation 
was permitted by management and according to several nurses, when NHS Direct started, 
management even facilitated this co-operation, however, during the second round of interviews 
NAs admitted that informal co-operation within the bureau was no longer easy, even if it was 
tolerated. Some NAs claimed that their new colleagues (who were being formally trained to enter a 
more mature, productivity conscious service) were more autonomous and self-driven. An NA 
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commented: ‘Well, if we take time talking with our colleagues, we produce less’. It thus appears 
that NHS Direct, following the lines of the New Public Management is becoming more targets 
oriented.   
 
In addition, a NHS Direct strategic document (Department of Health, 2003) envisioned an 
occupational re-division of labour, were nurses are reconfigured; health advisors possibly elevated; 
and CAS playing a more central role. Of interest to the occupational restructuring was the proposal 
to make Nurse Advisors specialists not generalists - a specialisation strategy, and secondly the 
proposal that callers should not automatically access a Nurse Advisor when they have a medical 
problem, but somebody with lower levels of nursing skills. According to several managers the 
creation and diffusion of informal general knowledge within the bureau is the ‘big plus of NHS 
Direct’ and specialisation would threaten this. Research on call time differences between specialist 
and non-specialist nurses for calls about paediatrics, revealed that the specialists in the field were 
quicker, but referral to triage outcome groups were with equal frequency (Monaghan et al 2003). In 
other words generalist nurses using CAS were delivering safe advice, but a bit slower than 
specialists. These call time differences are unlikely to mean call dedication, as this would pose 
labour market problems in finding specialist nurses, but rather lead to more training for generalists 
tele-nurses in specialist fields while in service. Thereby reinforcing the learning organisation nature 
of the service. Later documents moved against this position and in favour of the view expressed by 
a Senior Nurse in NHSD B: 
 
The organisational view is that we’re not going to have specialty Call Centres, and by virtue of 
the fact that Nurses do tend to be generalists and the training is very much a generalist training, 
but the Clinical Assessment software is there to ensure that no matter what experience the Nurse 
may have, if they’re skilled in listening and assessment and critical thinking and use it alongside 
the Clinical Assessment software, then there is going to be no difference in the quality of the 




Within NHSD call centres, clinical knowledge was not only spontaneously exchanged through 
nurses’ informal co-operation, but it is also acquired through other formal methods of acquisition, 
such as training, personal development plans and the constant use of authorised books and internet 
sites. During the induction training, nurses learn new skills and clinical information. Part of the 
training focuses on learning CAS - however NAs were also asked to attend University lectures 
(NHSD A) or seminars about some specific clinical aspects, which are considered relevant for 
becoming a tele-nurse:  
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…we have a whole afternoon of Paediatric assessment with a Lecturer and Practitioner who 
comes in and talks about Paediatric assessment. Because again a lot of the generalist Nurses 
won’t have been dealing with Paediatrics, so that one they may be actually learning, but in 
broader terms, things like women’s health, men’s health, A & E scenarios, and various other 
kinds of Clinical knowledge and skills is really much more broad based, because obviously we 
can’t cover everything. (Training manager, NHSD B) 
 
Previously I’d been a very specialised Nurse in Paediatrics, Intensive Care and Cardiology.  In 
NHS Direct you have to become a General Practitioner.  So there was a very steep learning 
curve in learning about Gynaecology and General Surgery that I hadn’t done previously (Nurse 
Advisor 7, NHSD A) 
 
 
Although, this new clinical information was mainly prescribed, NAs seemed to appreciate the 
chance and the time given to them for learning new things. As the NAs clearly express, training 
days became good opportunities to learn new clinical specialities:  
I’ve got two study days in fact coming up in the near future on areas that I wouldn’t have been 
specialist in, because my area as Health Visitor and Midwife would have been babies, mothers, 
young children, that sort of area.  There’s a training coming up on Ear, Nose and Throat 
problems and also on minor injuries, which will be very helpful for me, because I learn a lot 
from that, from the people who are actually doing the training. And they are study evenings; 
they’ll have them in the evenings, to accommodate people who can’t come during the day. 
(Nurse Advisor, 6, NHSD, A) 
 
There’s training days I think every month at the moment, and study days.  ... And we have shut-
down days as well where training’s offered, and also via Appraisal and PDP (Personal 
Development Plan) you can identify things that you want to do, and from recognised Courses, 
and then negotiate the time off-line of things to do, so that’s done very much on an individual 
basis. (Nurse Advisor 5, NHSD A) 
 
Usually if you identify that you want to do something in your Personal Development Plan, you 
know like the Review, if you identify that you’ve got learning needs and you want to do 
something, then they will normally try, and this is for all the extra things, but then they also 
have Training Sessions in the Call Centre, which, if you’re there, then you can go. (Nurse 
Advisor 1, NHSD B) 
 
There’s ongoing Training, but basically, again at the level that we operate we have to, not have 
to, but it’s expected that we should identify our own Training Needs.  … A lot of it is self-
driven though, identifying your Training Needs. (Nurse Advisors 7, NHSD B) 
 
 
Training days and informal co-operation are not the only occasions where nurses could take time to 
learn, as they other sources of learning were through authorized books and web sites. NAs were 
allowed to stop their telephone consultation for consulting these resources. The practice of 
consulting a manual or a web site during phone conversation was quite common. As the quote 




I think the thing about this job is I’ve been doing it now for three years, and I can honestly say 
that every day I’m here I learn something new. Because people are always phoning in with 
different problems and it’s very much a case of if one doesn’t know the answer, you either 
check with somebody else, or go to the Library.  I think that the training really consolidated a 
lot of the information and knowledge that I had, but this is an ever-changing job really and you 
definitely learn something new every day. (Nurse Advisor 8, NHSD A) 
 
 
As NAs are expert workers, managers cannot constrain them to follow tight productivity standards 
as Customers Services Representatives in conventional commercial call centres. In addition, tele-
nursing can be considered a new type of specialised nursing, growing in a new developing work 
environment. Management strategy over the character of this labour process has not been settled 




Tele-nurses work in a call centre setting but as expert labour they cannot be associated with 
conventional CSRs. NAs have not been transformed into a category of dispensable and inter-
changeable labour as has occurred in tele-banking and other service work where call centre 
technology has been applied. NAs are registered nurses who move from face-to-face nursing to tele-
nursing with previous clinical experience and knowledge, which represents a protection from the 
common de-skilling and work-intensification process experienced by CSRs. Moreover, many work 
part-time, and move between face-to-face and tele-nursing.  
 
However, NAs are in a call centre environment within NHS Direct and this differs for from 
conventional clinical setting. Interaction with callers is narrower, virtual and more frequent. In 
contrast to face-to-face nursing, NAs are subjected to new forms of technical control and 
monitoring represented by CAS. They are also within a medical/clinical setting, acting as referral 
and navigation agents, not one engaged in holistic nursing process. CAS limits NAs’ autonomy, but 
observations and interviews also revealed that NAs can manipulate the system and can also acquire 
new knowledge from the CDSS. Supporting other research (Monoghan, et al 2003) we found NAs 
internalising the knowledge given through CDSS, and seeing their knowledge and experience and 
that of CAS as complementary, which underestimated the power of the software. However, NAs to 
a certain extent were free to utilize their occupational practical knowledge to reshape the abstract 
knowledge of the CDSS. In contrast to conventional call centre environment, NAs are also allowed 
to ‘take time’ during telephone consultations for discussing with colleagues and consulting manuals 
and web sites. Moreover, on-going training opportunities are regularly offered to NAs. 
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We have suggested that CAS needs to be seen as existing within a dynamic and evolving context 
where workers and managers develop a practice through daily interactions with the CDSS, and the 
choices it necessitates. In other words, NHSD is at the early stages of work organisation 
development, and has not codified and tightly prescribed rules of practice, but rather permits a 
range of actions within a permissive context of expansion, and hence allows space for a relatively 
autonomous group of workers such as nurses, to do a variety of work, some of which may put them 
in the driving seat, while others place technical constraints on their actions. CAS in one sense 
represents objective knowledge, but we suggested that the Polanyian division of knowledge into 
explicit and tacit forms is not helpful, and that more critical is knowing the agency that is doing the 
interpretation, and currently NHS Direct management are unable to move away from nursing 
control due to safety fears and the need for expert labour to contextualise information provided in 
the call. CAS may be made robust or fool-proof, and one logic of IT rationalization points in the 
direction of labour substitution, automation and deskilling. But NAs, managers (at local and 
national levels) are also active in challenging this discourse of transformation because of the 
autonomy of each clinical interaction; the reflexive or interpretive nature of healthcare (Hanlon et al 
2005: 167) and the hazard of wrong advice and scepticism about technological fixes. In this sense 
CAS is simultaneously as a tool, control device and knowledge instrument, because a dominant 
practice has not been imposed or formulated, and is unlikely due to the interpretive nature of 
healthcare (Monaghan et al, 2003; O’Cathain et al 2004). What we have instead is a complex and 
hybrid picture, which clearly portrays the evolving nature of work organisation in the NHS Direct. 
 
So how can we describe the labour process within NHS Direct? Well it is still an open question. 
What our research revealed is a fragmented, complex and hybrid picture, which clearly portrays the 
developing nature of NHS Direct service. The labour process has not been able to transform NAs 
into inter-changeable and flexible tele-nurses. Initially NHS Direct represents the ideal niche for the 
introduction of ‘managerialism’ as a key doctrine of New Public Management (Klein, 1989, DHSS, 
1983; DHSS, 1987; DoH, 1989; Lapsey, 1994; Bolton, 2000). It is a target oriented call-centre; 
consequently it should embrace the neo-liberal ideology, which emphasises financial discipline, 
customer’s orientation and productivity. However, in reality managers have to deal with expert 
workers, thus at this stage (we do not know yet about the future) they consider it counter 
productive, in terms of work commitment and safety reasons, to restrict NAs ability to use their own 
knowledge. Tele-nurses are still nurses and tend to distance themselves from the counter negative 
image of conventional call centre work. However the question remains whether they are really 
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satisfied about their new profession and the chances given to them to acquire new clinical 
knowledge and skills or the rather that the positive comments revealed during the in interviews are 
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